Path to War

1005 00:53:23,333 --> 00:53:24,834 by fighting our kind of war? 1006 00:53:24,900 --> 00:53:27,333 Their tactics are terror and sniping. 1007 00:53:27,400 --> 00:53:29,600 They have better access to intelligence. 1008 00:53:29,667 --> 00:53:31,233 Why is this? 1009 00:53:31,300 --> 00:53:33,100 It's because the South Vietnamese government 1010 00:53:33,166 --> 00:53:37,333 is heavily infiltrated with Vietcong agents, Mr. President. 1011 00:53:37,400 --> 00:53:39,500 ( sighs ) What other road can we go? 1012 00:53:39,567 --> 00:53:41,300 Negotiations, stopping the bombing? 1013 00:53:41,367 --> 00:53:44,467 These make us look weak, with cup in hand. 1014 00:53:44,533 --> 00:53:47,033 Better to lose now than after committing 200,000 men. 1015 00:53:47,100 --> 00:53:48,300 I disagree. 1016 00:53:48,367 --> 00:53:50,200 We have to make a stand here. 1017 00:53:50,266 --> 00:53:52,934 And if we fail, it could be chalked up to any number of things. 1018 00:53:53,000 --> 00:53:55,133 Corruption amongst Saigon's leaders, for instance. 1019 00:53:55,200 --> 00:53:56,600 Then we can get out. 1020 00:53:56,667 --> 00:53:58,834 But this government will have stood up to the Communists. 1021 00:53:58,900 --> 00:54:00,734 But we won't get out, Bob. 1022 00:54:00,800 --> 00:54:03,734 We will double our bets and get massacred in the rice paddies. 1023 00:54:03,800 --> 00:54:05,900 So-- so what's your advice, George? 1024 00:54:05,967 --> 00:54:07,633 Cut and run? 1025 00:54:08,867 --> 00:54:10,533 Mr. President... 1026 00:54:12,066 --> 00:54:13,767 no great captain in history 1027 00:54:13,834 --> 00:54:16,333 ever hesitated to make a tactical withdrawal 1028 00:54:16,400 --> 00:54:18,834 when conditions were unfavorable to him. 1029 00:54:22,800 --> 00:54:26,100 Does anyone else here agree with what George is saying? 1030 00:54:30,200 --> 00:54:33,600 I've asked Clark Clifford to join us. 1031 00:54:33,667 --> 00:54:37,400 Clark, do you have any comments at this time? 1032 00:54:39,166 --> 00:54:42,266 I-- I have a question for General Wheeler. 1033 00:54:42,333 --> 00:54:43,567 Wheeler: Yes, sir. 1034 00:54:43,633 --> 00:54:46,300 - Good morning, General. - Good morning. 1035 00:54:46,367 --> 00:54:49,967 If the president proceeds with this plan, 1036 00:54:50,033 --> 00:54:54,033 what, in your view, would constitute a victory? 1037 00:54:54,100 --> 00:54:57,300 Wheeler: What is the definition of victory in this contest? 1038 00:54:57,367 --> 00:54:59,033 Yes. 1039 00:54:59,100 --> 00:55:01,700 A military victory in the traditional sense 1040 00:55:01,767 --> 00:55:04,166 is not what we are seeking. 1041 00:55:04,233 --> 00:55:06,867 To eliminate every last Vietcong guerilla 1042 00:55:06,934 --> 00:55:10,333 could require as many as half a million men 1043 00:55:10,400 --> 00:55:12,100 and five years-- 1044 00:55:12,166 --> 00:55:15,433 No one's considering those kind of numbers, no one. 1045 00:55:15,500 --> 00:55:18,900 Wheeler: Our objective is to reach a stalemate 1046 00:55:18,967 --> 00:55:21,266 whereby we are attriting the enemy 1047 00:55:21,333 --> 00:55:24,767 faster than he can replace his losses. 1048 00:55:24,834 --> 00:55:27,767 This is the so-called crossover point. 1049 00:55:27,834 --> 00:55:29,500 And how many men will this require? 1050 00:55:29,567 --> 00:55:31,967 Wheeler: A substantially smaller number, 1051 00:55:32,033 --> 00:55:36,200 depending on how the North Vietnamese respond. 1052 00:55:36,266 --> 00:55:39,467 Well, might they respond by sending in, say, 1053 00:55:39,533 --> 00:55:41,633 100,000 troops? 1054 00:55:41,700 --> 00:55:44,033 Wheeler: We regard this as unlikely. 1055 00:55:44,100 --> 00:55:47,166 Clifford: Well, this is less than half the men they have under arms. 1056 00:55:47,233 --> 00:55:48,600 Wheeler: Well, it's certainly possible. 1057 00:55:48,667 --> 00:55:50,867 They already have 50,000 men down there. 1058 00:55:50,934 --> 00:55:53,734 Clifford: And to achieve the ten-to-one superiority, 1059 00:55:53,800 --> 00:55:55,834 which I understand is barely adequate 1060 00:55:55,900 --> 00:55:59,900 for conventional forces in a guerilla situation, 1061 00:55:59,967 --> 00:56:02,233 how many troops would be required 1062 00:56:02,300 --> 00:56:04,133 to meet this possible threat? 1063 00:56:05,400 --> 00:56:07,767 As I said, this would be unlikely. 1064 00:56:07,834 --> 00:56:10,934 One million troops, is that not correct, General? 1065 00:56:12,033 --> 00:56:14,133 You see? 1066 00:56:14,200 --> 00:56:19,934 We would need one million men in Vietnam. 1067 00:56:27,433 --> 00:56:29,800 Excuse me. Clark. 1068 00:56:29,867 --> 00:56:31,433 I can't tell you how grateful I am 1069 00:56:31,500 --> 00:56:33,467 to finally have an ally at the barricades. 1070 00:56:33,533 --> 00:56:36,400 Well, it's just what makes sense, George. 1071 00:56:36,467 --> 00:56:39,433 Not to Bob McNamara, but to me. 1072 00:56:39